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Tax administration, Taxpayer’s Reciprocity and Compliance in Tanzania: Empirical 
Evidence from a Survey 
 




This paper analysed the effects of tax administration on taxpayer reciprocity and compliance. Four 
aspects: trust in the tax administration, corruption in tax administration, awareness and certainty 
of taxes to be paid, and ability of the tax administration to detect tax evaders were assessed.  We 
obtained strong support that these variables significantly influence reciprocity and compliance. 
The tax administration in Tanzania therefore needs to improve on these aspects in efforts to boost 
voluntary tax compliance. Also, in the same vein of making people more compliant there is a need 
to improve on provision of tax education. Likewise, the enhancement in utilisation of ICT in tax 
administration processes. 
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The need to mobilise resources to support government provision of public goods and services has 
never lacked urgency in developing countries like Tanzania. Mobilising resources for the 
government is however limited by the level of tax compliance. In Tanzania the level of compliance 
is very low. Tax revenue statistics from ICTD/UN-WIDER (2019) government revenue dataset 
indicate that the tax to GDP ratio for Tanzania has stagnated for many years at around 12 per cent. 
Personal income taxes for example contribute just 2 per cent of GDP. These tax collection levels 
are far below the average of sub-Saharan Africa (18 per cent) and even comparable neighbour 
economies like Kenya (18 per cent) and Rwanda (16.7 per cent). Due to weak resources 
mobilisation the country’s provision of important social services to its citizens is also low. The 
IMF (2015) and World Bank (2011) reports indicate undersupply of key social services in the 
country pointing to limitations in mobilising domestic resources. Therefore, much is left desired 
of the country’s tax system to ensure revenue adequacy for social services provision and 
development. The question, which remains, is how to improve tax compliance and revenue 
collection to such levels that speed the level of development. 
 
To improve tax compliance tax administrations often use both measures deterrence and non-
deterrence measures side by side, while promoting and nurturing voluntary compliance culture is 
gaining prominence in developing countries where compliance culture is generally low. Voluntary 
tax compliance depends on many factors, however the tax administration and its practices has a 
crucial role to play. A tax administration that is able to win taxpayers confidence and trust due to 
fair treatment and quality of service delivered will have leverage  on taxpayers’ decision to comply 
(see for example Feld and Frey, 2002; D'Arcy, 2011). This reciprocal relationship between 
taxpayers and the tax administration is well describe in an insightful framework termed the 
‘slippery slope’ (see Kirchler et al., 2008). Other areas of tax administration that have bearing 
effect on compliance include provision of taxpayer education, access to and adequacy of 
information provided to taxpayers, simplification of compliance procedures and reduction of 
compliance burdens through the use of technologies. Governance practices are also important 
aspects. For instance, high corruption perception diminishes taxpayer compliance morale. 
 
In this paper, we employed a large data set from Afrobarometer survey that among other variables 
measures respondent’s perception of tax administration and tax compliance behaviour. Four 
aspects: trust in the tax administration, corruption in tax administration, certainty of taxes to be 
paid, and ability of the tax administration to detect tax evaders were assessed on how they influence 
reciprocity and tax compliance. Consistent with previous studies, we obtain strong support that 
these variables significantly influence reciprocity and compliance. The tax administration in 
Tanzania therefore needs to improve on these aspects in efforts to boost voluntary tax compliance. 
 
In what follows, section two presents theoretical and empirical literature on tax compliance in 
relation to tax administration and reciprocity to government provision of services. Section three 
presents the overall methodology used including models specification and estimation procedures. 
Section four presents data used in the study and data description. Section five discusses the findings 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Tax compliance theory 
Tax compliance as a behavioural aspect is determined by taxpayer attitude towards taxes. If a 
taxpayer has negative attitude towards taxes deterrence measures need to be applied to enforce 
compliance, otherwise taxpayers comply voluntarily if they have positive attitude toward taxes. 
Thus, the literature on tax compliance often focuses on two main strands of theories; deterrence 
and non-deterrence. 
 
Deterrence theories (see Allingham and Sandmo model, 1972; Beron, Tauchen and Witte, 1988), 
deterrence model presents a theoretical framework for taxpayers’ incentive to evade taxes given 
the level of audits and other forms of tax compliance enforcement. They assume a principal agent 
that taxpayers’ decision to comply is based on utility from evading taxes. If they perceive that 
utility of not complying is higher given available sanctions such as penalties and fines they will 
evade. When such sanctions are perceived to be more costly than compliance taxpayers will 
comply with their tax obligations to avoid legal sanctions (such as penalties and incarceration). 
Here the ability of tax administration in detecting and punishing non-compliance is crucially 
important. However, the deterrence models fails to provide strong predictions of the 
socioeconomic determinants of tax evasion (Sheffrin and Tries, 1992). Further, enforcing 
compliance requires extra capacity in terms of resources. Given resources constraints, nature of 
economies and technology limitations, especially in low-income countries, only a fraction of all 
taxpayers can be audited and not all detected tax evaders are penalised. Thus, alternative models 
of tax compliance gain prominence in tax administration practices. Tax administrations often blend 
both deterrence and non-deterrence measures in fostering tax compliance. 
 
Turning to non-deterrence measures a strand of theories on social contract guides our discussion 
on the predictions of voluntary compliance. This model suggests that a contract is a commitment 
or pledge agreed by both parties, although only a metaphor because there is no signature above 
paper between the taxpayer and government. In taxation context, taxpayer is party who offers 
while the government accepts the offer. Taxpayer offer is to provide economic resources to obtain 
welfare, whereas the government accepts the offer and use the economic resources to create wealth 
for society. Therefore, taxpayer implements mutual interest principle to establish tax compliance 
and that tax compliance is not a purely economic decision but also depend on established social 
norms, morality, altruism and justice (Alm, 2012). Non-compliance by taxpayers is not only for 
profit but rather as a way to address non seriousness of government to fulfil the taxpayers’ rights 
within social contract (Mangoting et al., 2015). Conversely, if the taxpayer rights are not met, tax 
evasion becomes a justification for taxpayer. 
 
2.2 Tax administration and compliance in Tanzania 
According to Gupta and Mookherjee (1998), tax administration comprises three interrelated 
activities. These activities are (i) identification of tax liabilities based on existing tax legislations, 
(ii) the assessment of taxes to determine if the taxes paid are actually within tax liabilities, and (iii) 
the collection, prosecution, and penalty activities that impose sanctions on tax evaders and ensure 
that taxes and penalties due from the tax payers are actually collected. 
 
The tax administration in some cases refer to the government office that is responsible for 
administration of taxation – the tax authority. Broadly interpreted the main role of tax 
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administration is to administer the tax code for collection of government revenue. The tax 
administration achieves its revenue collection objective by influencing taxpayer compliance using 
various mechanisms – deterrence and non-deterrence. Thus, the level of compliance in any 
jurisdiction is dependent among other factors the capability and way the tax administration interact 
with taxpayers. 
 
Because of limited tax administration capability, tax compliance and productivity in Tanzania has 
remained very low. In efforts to improve tax administration capability there has been several 
changes in the Tanzania tax system. These include, among others, reorganisation of the tax 
administration itself, enhanced utilisation of ICT, increase staffing and financial resources, 
enhanced taxpayer service and education, open more tax offices to bring service close to taxpayers, 
improve enforcement mechanisms and commitment to taxpayer service (TRA Annual Reports, 
2014, 2015, 2016). Likewise, in realising the importance of quality service delivery to taxpayers 
for building trust and compliance, the tax administration is implementing a taxpayer’s service 
charter, which delineates the roles and responsibilities of the tax administration to the taxpayers 
(TRA, 2017). 
 
These changes reflects development in tax administration capability, which with changes in the 
economy and taxpayer compliance improvements have seen an increasing tax revenue collection. 
Tax revenue has increased in nominal term year after year, however the productivity remained 
relatively unchanged; the tax to GDP ratio almost remained stagnant at around 12 percent for a 
decade long (ICTD, 2019; TRA, 2019). This situation implies that tax compliance has not 
significantly relative to economy growth and there are needed more improvements in tax 
administration in order to increase compliance and revenue productivity. 
 
2.3 The role of tax administration in voluntary tax compliance 
A view on the effects of tax administration on compliance has highly focused on ability to deter 
tax evasion (see Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Das-Gupta, Lahiri, and Mookherjee, 1995; Das-
Gupta, Estrada and Park, 2016). However, there is increasing support that tax administration has 
potential for improving compliance through non-deterrence measures. The aspects of registration 
of taxpayers, timely declaration, filing, payment and post-filing process largely depends capability 
of the tax administration but more so on how the tax authority interacts with the taxpayers 
(Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010; Prichard et al., 2019. 
 
Also, trust in tax administration, which may be a result of perception of practices and perception 
of fairness influence voluntary taxpayer compliance.  A study by Fjelstad et al. (2004) in Tanzania 
reported that limited voluntary compliance of taxpayers is closely related to a lack of trust in the 
local government revenue systems. Likewise, Kastlunger et al. (2013) found evidence that trust is 
positively related to voluntary tax compliance. In relation to tax administration practices Kogler et 
al. (2016) points out that delayed feedback on tax audits affects taxpayers’ fairness perceptions. 
Similarly, Gobena amd Van Dijke (2017) argue that procedural justice affects trust in tax 
authorities and promotes voluntary compliance.  
 
As the tax administration represent an important duty of the government, taxpayers dissatisfaction 
with that service will render establishment of weak citizen-state relationship which in turn affect 
compliance. The social contract theories point out that taxpayers are more willing to comply with 
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taxes if they perceive that they can get in return fair treatment and important public goods and 
services from the government (Torgler, 2007; Alm et al., 2012: Mugoya, Chimilila and 
Chikongoye, 2013; Baum et al., 2017). Torgler (2007), argues that taxes can be seen as a pride 
paid for government’s positive actions. When taxpayers are satisfied with the way they are treated, 
the cooperation is enhanced. Likewise, cooperation increases if the outcome received from the 
government is judged to be fair in relation to the taxes.  
 
Another aspect of tax administration that affects compliance and reciprocity is governance. 
Corruption robs the potential tax revenue collection, destroys people’s faith in governing 
authorities and consequently make them less willing to cooperate including paying taxes (Mauro, 
2002). Presence of rampant corruption in tax administration diminishes willingness to comply and 
represents a significant revenue loss due to collusion between tax officials and taxpayers. If 
taxpayers perceive that taxes paid benefit tax officials instead of boosting government coffers then 
their attitude towards tax compliance diminishes or decides to operate informally which makes it 
more difficult to tax hidden incomes (see Uslaner, 2008). 
 
Compliance is in one way depending on certainty of taxes. However, most of taxpayers in 
developing countries have low level of general education, comprehending tax laws is somewhat 
difficult for them. A study by Ali et al (2013) pointed out that one of the limitations for taxpayer 
compliance is difficulty of finding out what taxes to comply. Knowledge about tax is important 
can contribute to shaping attitudes towards compliance (see Mascagni and Santoro, 2018).  
 
Support for compliance such as provision taxpayer service and education is another aspect. 
Mascagni and Santoro (2018) argue on the importance of taxpayer education for tax compliance 
in Africa. In line with education on paying taxes is the issue of adequacy and accessibility of 
information provided to the taxpayers. The use of technologies such as mobile phones, call centres 
and internet have improved access of information. 
 
Likewise, the tax administration has a role to improve compliance by easing the compliance 
process – burdensome procedures increase taxpayer compliance costs (Dabla-Norris, 2017) which 
in turn diminishes compliance. Some countries, including Tanzania are utilizing mobile 
technologies for payment of taxes, which simplifies the payment process thereby reducing 
compliance costs, improve convenience to the taxpayers and in turn enhance compliance (see 
Cotton and Dark, 2017; McCluskey and Huang, 2019). As tax compliance burdens are regressive 
in nature, efforts that alleviate tax compliance burdens are likely to benefit more small and medium 
business (Dabla-Norris, 2017) and improve compliance. 
 
3. Empirical model and methodology 
In order to test empirically the effect of the effect of tax administration on taxpayer reciprocity and 
compliance attitude, two separate models have been estimated. The first model is for determinants 
of reciprocity and the second model for compliance attitude. Using the latest data from 
Afrobarometer survey (2016) we assigned two variables as dependent variables, respectively. The 
dependent variable for taxpayer reciprocity is based on the question “If the government decided to 
make people pay more taxes or user fees in order to increase spending on public health care, would 
you support this decision or oppose it? This variable is measured in five-point ordinal scale defined 
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as; 5 if individual strongly support, 4 = somewhat support, 3 = neither support nor oppose, 2 = 
somewhat oppose and 1 = strongly oppose to pay more taxes to increase health spending. 
 
For compliance attitude we use the question “….please tell me whether you think the action is not 
wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable: Not paying the taxes they owe 
on their income? This variable is measured in five-point ordinal scale defined as; 3 if individual 
think it is wrong and punishable, 2= wrong, but understandable and 1 = not wrong at all when 
he/she do not pay taxes. 
 
Since the dependent variables are measured in ordinal scale, in both cases we employed ordered 
logistic models as specified below. 
 
ii xy  *       (1) 
 
where y is taxpayer reciprocity or compliance attitude. Since the dependent variables are latent, 
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Assuming that µi is a random and normally distributed error term, then the ordered logit technique 
uses the observations on y to fit the parameter vector β. Using maximum likelihood estimation 
method we can estimate the cumulative probability of obtaining y as, 
 
   xkFxjy j  |Pr      (3) 
 
The probability of obtaining a response y = j for j= 1, 2,…..,J is estimated as, 
 
      xkFxkFxjy jj  1|Pr    (4) 
 
In order to interpret the coefficients in ordered logit models we need to determine how a marginal 
change in one regressor changes the distribution of the outcome variable i.e. marginal probability 
effects. The marginal probability effects can be calculated as, 
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In general, the magnitude of these probability changes depends on the specific values of the ith 
observation’s covariates. As such, we obtain average marginal probability effects for changes in 
covariates. 
 

















Pr  j=1, 2, ..., M-1  (6) 
 
where y are dependent variables representing reciprocity or compliance attitude and x is a vector 
of independent and control variables that influence taxpayer reciprocity and compliance. The 
independent variables are age, sex, education, employment status, trust tax administration, 
corruption of tax officials, difficulty of knowing which taxes to pay, difficulty of avoid paying 
taxes, awareness of civic responsibility to pay taxes and previous incidence of refusing to pay 
taxes. 
 
4. Data and preliminary analysis 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data for the study were compiled from the Afrobarometer round 6 survey (2016). The 
Afrobarometer survey covered a total of 36 African countries and elicited public attitude on various 
social aspects including taxation. For Tanzania the survey covered a sample size of 2,386 randomly 
selected respondents across all 30 administrative regions in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, of 
which 35% represent respondents in urban and 65% in rural. Given the urban-rural split of the 
population in Tanzania where majority live in rural areas, this distribution of the sample makes it 
a more representative. Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used. It can 
be seen from Table 1 that people have a marginally agreement in trust in tax administration, 
perception of corruption, and reciprocity to pay more taxes. Difficult to find out taxes or fees to 
pay, difficult to avoid paying taxes and right or wrong to pay taxes have a relatively higher 
assessment by majority of taxpayers as indicated by mean values somewhat higher than the mid 
values of the scale. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable N Min. Max. Avg. 
Refused to pay tax or fee to the government 2314 2 5 2.4 
The tax authorities have the right to make people 
pay taxes 
2290 1 5 3.7 
Trust tax department 2225 1 4 2.7 
Corruption: tax officials 2102 1 4 2.4 
Difficulty to find out what taxes or fees to pay 2232 1 4 3.1 
Difficulty to avoid paying taxes 2271 1 5 3.3 
Pay more taxes to increase health spending 2333 1 5 2.9 
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4.2 Semi-parametric analysis 
Semi-parametric analysis using Chi-square (χ2) is performed as a preliminary analysis to test the 
significance of association between the dependent and the variables assumed to influence it. It can 
be seen from Table 2 below that the variables which depicts tax administration quality i.e. trust, 
corruption of tax officials, difficulty of finding out taxes to pay and difficulty to avoid paying have 
significant association with reciprocity and compliance attitude. In the subsequent section we 
estimate the nature of effect of these variables on the probability of taxpayer to reciprocate and 
comply while using control variables that influence these decisions. 
 
Table 2: Results of Semi-parametric Chi-square analysis 
Variable Reciprocity  Compliance attitude 
 χ2 p-value  χ2 p-value 
Refused to pay tax or fee to the government 77.850 0.000  105.473 0.000 
The tax authorities always have the right to 




Trust tax department 43.650 0.000  25.389 0.000 
Corruption: tax officials 110.279 0.000  3.302 0.069 
Difficulty to find out what taxes or fees to pay 84.879 0.000  21.750 0.001 
Difficulty to avoid paying taxes 83.323 0.000  37.856 0.000 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Results of ordered logit regression model for taxpayer reciprocity 
Results of ordered logistics for taxpayer reciprocity are presented in Tables 3 and 5. Results in 
Table 3 indicate that the predicted probability of having an individual disagree with paying more 
taxes to increase health spending is slightly more than 0.5. The probability that an individual agree 
with paying more taxes in order for government to increase health spending is about 0.4. 
 
Table 3: Predictive margins for taxpayer reciprocity 
 Margin Std. Err. Z p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Pr (Y=1) 0.2463 0.0116 21.24 0.0000 0.2236 0.2690 
Pr (Y=2) 0.2730 0.0122 22.38 0.0000 0.2491 0.2969 
Pr (Y=3) 0.1014 0.0083 12.23 0.0000 0.0852 0.1177 
Pr (Y=4) 0.1892 0.0107 17.6 0.0000 0.1681 0.2103 
Pr (Y=5) 0.1901 0.0107 17.78 0.0000 0.1691 0.2110 
 
A number of factors can explain the reasons for this high likelihood of lack of taxpayer reciprocity. 
One of these reasons is individuals trust in tax administration; only 21.8% of respondents indicate 
that they trust a lot the tax department. Further, results in Table 5 (see appendix) show a negative 
marginal effect of trust in tax administration for individuals who oppose increase of taxes to 
increase health spending. Corruption of tax officials and difficulty of knowing taxes to pay have 
negative but insignificant effect on taxpayer reciprocity. Employment status and education have 
positive marginal effects indicating that individuals who are in formal employment and those with 
high level of education are likely to reciprocate by contributing more to the government in terms 
of taxes to support more provision of public goods and services. Age and gender, both have 
positive but insignificant effects. Further, Figure 1 (see appendix) depicts the effects on probability 
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of changes in explanatory variables. It can be seen from Figure 1 that trust in tax administration 
has positive effect on probability of individual to strongly support paying more taxes to support 
health spending, while difficulty of knowing taxes to pay has negative effect. Perception of tax 
officials corruption and difficulty of avoid taxes have almost no effect. Perception of civic duty to 
pay taxes has positive effect. Level of education has positive effect on probability for strong 
support for reciprocity. These results indicate that trust in tax administration plays a strong role on 
influencing taxpayer reciprocity. As only 21.8% strongly trust the tax department, there is a dire 
need to improve on this aspect. 
 
5.2 Results of ordered logit regression model for compliance attitude 
Results of ordered logit regression for taxpayer compliance attitude are presented in Tables 4 and 
6. Results in Table 4 indicate that the prediction that an individual will exhibit positive attitude 
towards tax compliance is 0.63. However, the actual compliance may be much less to a number of 
factors, such as the tax administration capacity to detect tax evaders, as predicted by Alligham and 
Sandmo model. Turning to results of ordered logit model, it can be seen from Table 6 that trust in 
tax administration has positive effect on marginal probability effect and perception of corruption 
of tax officials has negative and significant effect. Difficulty of knowing taxes to comply has 
negative but insignificant effect while difficulty of avoid taxes has positive and significant effect. 
Awareness of civic responsibility of paying taxes has positive and significant effect while previous 
experience of refusing to pay taxes due to dissatisfaction with government services has negative 
and significant effect. Similar results (in Figure 2), shows the effects of these variables of 
probabilities of compliance. In sum, these results indicate that taxpayers compliance attitude is 
strongly influenced by trust in tax administration, perception of corruption of tax officials, difficult 
of avoid taxes and satisfaction with government services. Thus, the tax administrations, which 
builds trust with taxpayers, implement governance practices proved by taxpayers, and which 
devise proper mechanisms for detecting and punishing tax evaders are likely to see improved tax 
compliance. Although difficulty of knowing taxes to pay has insignificant effect, since its effect is 
negative it indicate the demand for taxpayer education for improved compliance. Similarly, the 
finding that education has positive effect on compliance supports this later argument. 
 
Table 4: Predictive margins for taxpayer compliance 
 Margin Std. Err. Z p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Pr (Y=1) 0.0895 0.0077 11.57 0.0000 0.0743 0.1047 
Pr (Y=2) 0.2760 0.0121 22.85 0.0000 0.2523 0.2997 




6. Summary and Policy implications 
This paper analysed the effects of tax administration on taxpayer reciprocity and compliance. Four 
aspects: trust in the tax administration, corruption in tax administration, awareness and certainty 
of taxes to be paid, and ability of the tax administration to detect tax evaders were assessed on how 
they influence reciprocity and tax compliance. Consistent with previous studies, we obtain strong 
support that these variables significantly influence reciprocity and compliance. The tax 
administration in Tanzania therefore needs to improve on these aspects in efforts to boost voluntary 
tax compliance. 




Thus, the tax administration needs to instil taxpayers’ trust. This can be achieved through 
improving the way taxpayers are treated so that they perceive fairness of procedures. Another 
aspect is improvement in governance practices. This has impacts on improve fairness, reciprocity, 
trust and in turn compliance. The tax administration also need to improve on provision of 
information to the taxpayers for making them aware of taxes. This has to go with simplification of 
the tax code or packaging of ease to follow instructions to ordinary taxpayers in order to make 
them more aware of tax issues. Similarly, the tax administration needs to enhance the mechanisms 
of detecting tax evaders. This can be achieved through improvements in audits, use of third part 
information, and enhance utilisation of ICT in tax administration. 
 
Since the general tax education is very low in Tanzania, in the same vein of making people more 
compliant there is a need to improve on provision of tax education. The tax education contents can 
be introduced from primary level education. Likewise, more utilisation of ICT in tax 
administration will improve governance and increase trust and perception of fairness by reducing 
direct contacts between taxpayer and tax officials, reduce compliance burden, ease access of 
information and eventually improve taxpayer compliance. 
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Appendix: Results of Ordered Logit Regression Analysis 
Table 5: Ordered Logit regression and marginal effects of taxpayer reciprocity 
Variable Predict
*
 dy/dx Std. Err. Z P-value   [95% Conf. Int.] 
Trust tax department 1 -0.0241 0.0102 -2.37 0.0180 -0.0440 -0.0042 
 2 -0.0079 0.0034 -2.34 0.0190 -0.0146 -0.0013 
 3 0.0018 0.0008 2.18 0.0290 0.0002 0.0034 
 4 0.0104 0.0044 2.37 0.0180 0.0018 0.0190 
 5 0.0198 0.0084 2.36 0.0180 0.0034 0.0363 
Tax official corruption 1 0.0016 0.0128 0.12 0.9020 -0.0235 0.0267 
 2 0.0005 0.0042 0.12 0.9020 -0.0078 0.0088 
 3 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.12 0.9020 -0.0020 0.0017 
 4 -0.0007 0.0055 -0.12 0.9020 -0.0115 0.0102 
 5 -0.0013 0.0105 -0.12 0.9020 -0.0220 0.0194 
Difficult to know taxes to pay 1 0.0173 0.0126 1.37 0.1700 -0.0074 0.0419 
 2 0.0057 0.0042 1.37 0.1700 -0.0024 0.0138 
 3 -0.0013 0.0010 -1.32 0.1860 -0.0031 0.0006 
 4 -0.0075 0.0054 -1.37 0.1690 -0.0181 0.0032 
 5 -0.0142 0.0104 -1.37 0.1700 -0.0345 0.0061 
Employment status 1 -0.0359 0.0183 -1.97 0.0490 -0.0718 -0.0001 
 2 -0.0119 0.0062 -1.92 0.0550 -0.0240 0.0002 
 3 0.0026 0.0014 1.88 0.0600 -0.0001 0.0054 
 4 0.0156 0.0079 1.96 0.0500 0.0000 0.0311 
 5 0.0296 0.0152 1.95 0.0510 -0.0002 0.0594 
Gender 1 -0.0266 0.0180 -1.48 0.1390 -0.0618 0.0086 
 2 -0.0088 0.0060 -1.47 0.1420 -0.0205 0.0029 
 3 0.0019 0.0014 1.44 0.1500 -0.0007 0.0046 
 4 0.0115 0.0078 1.48 0.1390 -0.0037 0.0268 
 5 0.0219 0.0148 1.48 0.1400 -0.0072 0.0510 
Age 1 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.58 0.5650 -0.0004 0.0002 
 2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.58 0.5650 -0.0001 0.0001 
 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.57 0.5690 0.0000 0.0000 
 4 0.0000 0.0001 0.58 0.5650 -0.0001 0.0002 
 5 0.0001 0.0001 0.58 0.5650 -0.0002 0.0003 
Education 1 -0.0095 0.0026 -3.6 0.0000 -0.0147 -0.0044 
 2 -0.0031 0.0009 -3.49 0.0000 -0.0049 -0.0014 
 3 0.0007 0.0002 3.02 0.0030 0.0002 0.0012 
 4 0.0041 0.0011 3.6 0.0000 0.0019 0.0064 
 5 0.0079 0.0022 3.57 0.0000 0.0035 0.0122 
 Takes values 5 if individual strongly support, 4 = somewhat support, 3 = neither support nor 
oppose, 2 = somewhat oppose and 1 = strongly oppose to pay more taxes to increase health 
spending. 
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Table 6: Ordered Logit regression and marginal effects of taxpayer compliance 
Variable Predict
* 
dy/dx Std. Err. Z P-value [95% Conf. Int.] 
Trust tax department 1 -0.0039 0.0012 -3.32 0.0010 -0.0062 -0.0016 
 
2 -0.0067 0.0019 -3.47 0.0010 -0.0105 -0.0029 
 
3 0.0107 0.0031 3.47 0.0010 0.0046 0.0167 
Tax official corruption 1 0.0127 0.0065 1.95 0.0510 -0.0001 0.0254  
2 0.0217 0.0110 1.98 0.0480 0.0002 0.0433 
 
3 -0.0344 0.0174 -1.98 0.0480 -0.0685 -0.0003 
Difficult to know taxes to pay 1 0.0120 0.0074 1.62 0.1040 -0.0025 0.0265 
 
2 0.0207 0.0126 1.64 0.1000 -0.0040 0.0453 
 
3 -0.0327 0.0199 -1.64 0.1000 -0.0716 0.0063 
Difficult to avoid pay taxes 1 -0.0157 0.0076 -2.06 0.0390 -0.0307 -0.0008 
 
2 -0.0270 0.0129 -2.09 0.0370 -0.0524 -0.0017  
3 0.0427 0.0204 2.09 0.0360 0.0027 0.0828 
Civic duty 1 -0.0230 0.0045 -5.07 0.0000 -0.0319 -0.0141 
 
2 -0.0395 0.0070 -5.61 0.0000 -0.0533 -0.0257 
 
3 0.0625 0.0111 5.64 0.0000 0.0408 0.0842 
Refused tax 1 0.0407 0.0078 5.2 0.0000 0.0253 0.0560  
2 0.0698 0.0123 5.66 0.0000 0.0457 0.0940 
 
3 -0.1105 0.0192 -5.74 0.0000 -0.1482 -0.0728 
Employment status 1 0.0408 0.0101 4.05 0.0000 0.0210 0.0605 
 
2 0.0700 0.0164 4.28 0.0000 0.0380 0.1021 
 
3 -0.1108 0.0257 -4.3 0.0000 -0.1613 -0.0604 
Gender 1 -0.0150 0.0092 -1.63 0.1030 -0.0331 0.0030 
 
2 -0.0258 0.0157 -1.64 0.1010 -0.0566 0.0050  
3 0.0408 0.0248 1.64 0.1000 -0.0078 0.0895 
Age 1 0.0000 0.0001 -0.22 0.8240 -0.0002 0.0002 
 
2 0.0000 0.0002 -0.22 0.8240 -0.0003 0.0003 
 
3 0.0001 0.0003 0.22 0.8240 -0.0004 0.0005 
Education 1 -0.0029 0.0014 -2.11 0.0350 -0.0055 -0.0002  
2 -0.0049 0.0023 -2.14 0.0320 -0.0094 -0.0004 
 
3 0.0078 0.0036 2.14 0.0320 0.0007 0.0149 
 Takes values 3 if individual think it is wrong and punishable, 2= wrong, but understandable 
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Figure 1: Average marginal effects on taxpayer reciprocity 
 
Figure 2: Average marginal effects on taxpayer compliance 
 
